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The Collier-Dollar approach to aid allocation among countries has been less than 
fully embraced by donors – even those focused on poverty reduction – partly because 
it  conflicts  with  the  approach  to  aid  allocation  implied  by  the  Millennium 
Development Goals.  These two approaches are shown to be special cases of a more 
general model of aid allocation, in which donors care about future as well as current 
poverty.  This model is illustratively applied to data for developing regions.  Adding a 
poverty decline adjustment to the allocation formulae used by donors could resolve 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a pair of brilliant and influential articles, Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) proposed 
and  illustrated  empirically  a  formal  model  for  allocating  total  world  aid  among 
recipient countries in such a way as to maximise its impact on the reduction of world 
poverty.  Their model has become widely known in the aid donor community, and has 
influenced the actions of important development agencies. 
 
The actual allocation of aid, however, continues to diverge widely from that suggested 
by the Collier-Dollar (C-D) model, even among donors whose main objective is the 
reduction of world poverty.  One consistent feature of this divergence is the allocation 
of more aid to Africa than the C-D model recommends, and correspondingly less aid 
to  other  poor  countries,  particularly  those  in  South  Asia.    This  emphasis  was 
reinforced by the Commission for Africa (2005) and Millennium Project (2005), and 
by the 2005 G8 and UN Millennium Summits, which all called for more aid to Africa 
because of its slow progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
 
The reason for this striking divergence, it will be argued in this paper, is that the C-D 
model does not fully capture the preferences of donors (and their tax-payers) about 
reduction of world poverty.  C-D omit time, so that the relative needs for aid of 
different countries depend only on their current levels of poverty, whereas donors and 
people care – for intellectually and morally defensible reasons – about both current 
and future levels of poverty.  Specifically, donors are attracted by the MDGs and 
allocate more aid to Africa and less aid to Asia than would be justified by the current 
relative  poverty  of  these  regions  (a)  because  what  they  want  to  reduce  is  some 
combination of current and future poverty and (b) because they believe that in the 
absence of aid poverty would decline more slowly in Africa than in Asia. 
 
At present, however, donors are struggling to apply their preferences and beliefs to 
aid allocation in a consistent way.  In addition to the time-related inconsistency of 
principle between the MDGs and the C-D-based allocation formulae used by donors, 
there is a practical inconsistency between the target-based method of the MDGs and 
the optimising method of the C-D model.  A key purpose of this paper is to help 
donors to act more consistently by suggesting a way of combining the C-D and MDG 
approaches into a single approach that retains the strong points of each of them. 
 
The essence of the combined approach is conveyed by Figure 1.  The vertical axis 
measures the amount of poverty in a country (poverty rate multiplied by population), 
and the horizontal axis measures time, from the present to a planning horizon, T.  The 
aspect that matters for aid allocation in the C-D model is the initial height, H0: the 
greater is poverty today, the more aid should the country get.  The aspect that matters 
for MDG-based aid allocation is the slope of H0HT: the more slowly would poverty 
otherwise decline in the future, the more aid should the country get.  The combined 
approach proposed in this paper is to base allocations on the area 0H0HTT, which 
depends both on a country’s initial level of poverty and on its projected rate of decline 
in poverty: the larger is this area, the more aid should the country get. 
 
The rest  of the paper develops this  simple idea.  Section 2  recapitulates  the  C-D 
model,  and  section  3  reviews  its  influence  – and  the  limits  of  its influence  –  on 
donors.  Section 4 develops a forward-looking allocation model, of which it is shown QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 3 
in section 5 that the C-D and MDG-based approaches are special cases.  Section 6 
applies  this  model  illustratively  to  data  for  developing  regions,  and  compares  its 
allocations with those of the C-D and MDG approaches.  Section 7 shows how donors 
could modify their existing allocation formulae (which are formally compared to the 
C-D model in an appendix) to make them forward-looking.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. The Collier-Dollar model 
 
Collier and Dollar conceptualised the donor problem as 
 
Max poverty reduction ￿
i
i i i i N h Ga      (1) 
 
subject to ￿ =
i
i i i A N y A ,      0 ³
i A       (2) 
 
where the superscript i indexes countries and h
i is a measure of poverty relative to 
each country’s population, N
i,  so  that h
iN
i is the total amount of  poverty  in each 
country.  G
i is the growth rate of per capita income (usually non-negative) and ￿
i is 
the (negative) elasticity of h
i with respect to per capita income, so that the objective, 
summed over all countries, is to maximise the reduction in the total amount of poverty 
in the world.  If h
i were a poverty headcount, for example, the objective would be to 
achieve the largest possible cut in the global number of poor people. 
 
The constraints (2) are that the sum of aid to all countries equals the global total of 
available aid,  A , and that no country can receive negative aid.  Aid to each country, 
A
i, is measured as a ratio of its GDP, which is multiplied by its per capita income, y
i, 
and population to yield its absolute receipts of aid.  The objective is connected to the 
constraints by  a functional relationship between  growth and  aid for each country, 
which C-D specify and estimate as 
 
i i i i i i i P A b A b A b P b X b c G 5
2
4 3 2 1 + + + + + =       (3) 
 
where  P
i  measures  the  quality  of  each  country’s  policies  and  X
i  is  a  vector  of 
exogenous influences.  They derive from the solution to the constrained maximisation 
problem an expression for the optimal level of aid to each recipient country, which 
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i is the absolute amount of aid 
(the initial N
iy
i just converts the whole expression from A
i to a
i).  The initial negative 
sign is offset by b4 also being negative (it measures the speed with which returns to 
aid diminish), so that the whole expression is positive for countries that are allocated 
some aid (for those which are not, it is zero or negative). 
 
Inside the chain bracket, the two terms in the round bracket show that countries with 
better policies are allocated more aid (b3 and b5 must be considered jointly – C-D, QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 4 
2002: 1478).  This is because the specification of equation (3) makes the effectiveness 
of aid in increasing growth and hence in reducing poverty depend on the quality of 
policies (and only on the quality of policies).  The presence of ￿
i in the denominator 
of a term with a negative sign shows that more aid is also allocated to countries with 
larger poverty elasticities (where growth is more effective in reducing poverty). 
 
The final ratio, y
i/h
i, which is also part of a term with a negative sign, shows that more 
aid is allocated to countries with higher poverty rates and that less aid tends to be 
allocated to countries with higher per capita incomes (though the y
i in front of the 
chain bracket pulls the other way).  The ratio between h
i and y
i matters because C-D 
explicitly  assume,  and  equation  (1)  implies,  that  aid  can  reduce  poverty  only  by 
raising national income, which makes it more efficient to give aid to countries with 
more poverty per dollar of national income (H
i/y
iN





i in the first term of equation (4) implies that the allocation of aid to a country varies 
in proportion to its population (other things being equal).  Both C-D papers recognise 
that in reality the allocation of aid is biased against large countries.  In C-D (2001), N
i 
is raised to a power between zero and one (the estimated value was 0.32, which means 
that a ten-fold increase in population only roughly doubles the amount of aid).  In C-D 
(2002), aid to India was capped.  Both these adjustments were purely pragmatic: size 
bias contradicts the logic of the C-D model and will therefore be largely neglected in 
this paper until the discussion of donor allocation formulae in section 7. 
 
3. Use and non-use of the C-D model 
 
The C-D framework has powerful attractions to donors who want to reduce world 
poverty.  Its logic is simple and compelling: give more aid to countries where there is 
more poverty and where aid will have more impact on poverty (because the policy 
environment for growth is better or because growth reduces poverty more).  Its form 
gives precision to this logic by showing exactly how much more aid should go to 
countries which have more poverty and use aid better, and exactly how these two 
criteria should be combined and traded off against one another. 
 
These  attractions  have  led  to  widespread  discussion  of  the  C-D  model  by  donor 
agencies and to improvements in aid allocation practice (Beynon, 2002; McGillivray, 
2003).  Most multilateral agencies – for example, the World Bank, African and Asian 
Development Banks, and European Development Fund – use related models for aid 
allocation (Keith, 2002), though some of them long pre-date C-D.
2  A few bilateral 
agencies, for example in the UK  and the Netherlands, also  use allocation  models 
informed by C-D principles, and even in agencies which do not use formal models 
allocation decisions are influenced by these principles (Jones et al., 2004) 
 
There are also many divergences of donor practice from the C-D model.  Most donors 
have motives other than poverty reduction for giving aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000), 
which explain, for example, why middle-income countries receive far more aid than 
in a ‘poverty-efficient’ C-D allocation.  Even where poverty reduction is the focus, no 
agency uses the C-D model in the exact form described in section 2: it refers to the 
                                                
2 The World Bank’s model for allocating IDA funds on the basis of per capita income, population size 
and performance has been in use for three decades (Isenman et al., 1977).  It has proved more durable 
than the project appraisal methods initiated at about the same time (Little and Mirrlees, 1990). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 5 
whole developing world, while most donors deal with limited sets of countries (even 
the World Bank is restricted to IDA-eligible ones).  Donors prefer simple formulae to 
optimising models (with implications to be discussed in section 7 and the appendix).  
Their formulae include causes of aid effectiveness other than the quality of policies, 
and they deviate from formula allocations where they have more information than in 
the formula about the effectiveness of aid to specific countries. 
 
None of these considerations, however, can explain why donors whose professed aim 
is to reduce world poverty allocate more aid to Africa and less aid to Asia than a C-D 
model would recommend.  The IDA allocation formula, for example, is subject to the 
constraint (imposed by contributing donors) that at least 50% of the total should go to 
Africa.  The ‘European Consensus’ on development policy earmarks for Africa half of 
its large planned increase in aid.  The DFID model used in allocating aid among low-
income countries is likewise applied separately to Africa, whose overall allocation is a 
prior political decision.  The relatively low allocations to Asia partly reflect size bias 
against India and China, but there is clearly a strong bias towards Africa, too. 
 
C-D aid allocation principles are also in conflict with the now-dominant approach to 
world poverty reduction of the MDGs, particularly as interpreted in the report of the 
Millennium Project (2005) directed by Jeffrey Sachs.  Associated with the MDGs are 
targets, mostly proportional reductions in poverty indicators – for example, halving 
the income poverty headcount rate and a two-thirds fall in the under-five mortality 
rate.  These targets were originally set for the world as a whole, but Sachs applied 
them to individual countries (e.g. that each country should halve its headcount rate 
between 1990 and 2015), and argued that the basic principle of aid allocation should 
be to enable every developing country to achieve all its targets.
3 
 
Comparisons between the Sachs and C-D approaches must recognise that the MDGs 
are multi-dimensional, while the C-D model has a single-valued measure of poverty.  
The two approaches also make entirely different assumptions about total aid, which in 
the C-D model is predetermined but for Sachs is an end-result of the calculations (the 
sum needed for every country to achieve its targets).  But they are clearly inconsistent, 
as is illustrated by Anderson and Waddington (2007).  The poverty reduction targets 
of Sachs are set without regard to initial poverty levels (e.g. halving the headcount 
rate, regardless of whether it started at 50% or 5%).  As a result, the Sachs aid total 
could be reallocated on C-D principles to achieve a larger reduction in world poverty 
– but with many countries falling short of their MDG targets.  Each approach yields a 
sub-optimal allocation from the point of view of the other approach. 
 
4. A forward-looking allocation model 
 
To understand these discrepancies between C-D model allocations and how donors 
actually allocate aid – to Africa and for achieving MDG targets – it is necessary to 
bring time into the formal analysis.  When policy-makers write about ‘eliminating 
world poverty’ (as in the titles of all DFID’s White Papers) or ‘dream of a world free 
of poverty’ (as inscribed in the lobby of the World Bank’s headquarters), they are 
looking forward.  They have in mind the future, as well as the present – unavoidably, 
                                                
3 In one of their two articles, Collier and Dollar (2001) applied their model to the MDGs to develop a 
scenario  of improved aid allocation and policy  reform that would efficiently  achieve the target  of 
halving poverty in Africa as a whole, as well as globally (but not in each individual country). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 6 
since although the global total of abject poverty can and eventually will be reduced to 
almost zero, this is bound to take a long time. 
 
Analytically, this aspiration of donors is best thought of as being to minimise future 
world poverty.  Future world poverty in turn can be thought of as world poverty in 
each future year, added up in some way over some appropriate time horizon, T.  The 
simplest possible way to express this objective formally would thus be: 
 
Min   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
=
=












i H H H H
0
1 0 .....       (5) 
 
where the superscript i as before indexes countries and the subscript t (= 0, 1, ..., T) 






t N h H = , using 
whatever measure of poverty donors prefer and allowing for population size as well as 
the poverty rate.  Policy-makers may be systematically more concerned about poverty 
in the nearer-term future than in the more distant future, which can be formalised by 
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This objective can more conveniently be rewritten in continuous time as  
 














H n - D = D  is the proportional decline per period in the level of country i’s 
poverty, allowing for both the reduction in its poverty rate, 
i
h D , and the growth of its 
population, n
i (which slows the decline in its absolute amount of poverty).  These 
rates of change and the discount rate are assumed for simplicity to be constant up to 

















0             (8) 
 
The longer the time horizon, the closer to unity is the numerator of the ratio, so that if 
T were infinite the expression would be simply 
 





H0               (9) 
 
The  ‘present  value’  of  each  country’s  future  poverty  thus  depends  on  its  current 
poverty, 
i H0, but is reduced by a faster future rate of decline in poverty and by a 
higher discount rate, to an extent dependent on the length of the time horizon.  It is the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 7 
sum across all countries of these present values that donors are assumed to be seeking 
to minimise through the allocation of their aid. 
 
As in C-D (2002), it is also assumed that what needs to be allocated is just the current 
period’s aid total,  0 A .  The future rate of decline of poverty will be affected by aid in 
future periods, for which allowance needs to be made in projecting 
i
H D , together with 
all other influences on each country’s future poverty except the current period’s aid.  
An ideal forward-looking model would allocate aid in all future periods, too, since the 
impact on world poverty reduction of a given total amount of aid could be increased 
by distributing it optimally among periods as well as among countries.  But in reality, 
agencies allocate only the aid budgets for their current planning periods (for example, 
each three-year IDA replenishment) and cannot shift money between periods.
4 
 
To complete the allocation model, it is necessary to specify how current aid affects 
future poverty, which it could do in two possible ways.  It could cause a step change, 
reducing the level of poverty in all future periods: thus  ( )
i i a H 0 0  relates the amount of 
poverty in country i at the end of period zero to the aid it receives during that period, 
i a0 .  The current period’s aid could also speed the future rate of decline of poverty, the 
relationship being  ( )
i i
H a0 D .  The Lagrangian based on equation (8) is thus 
 
( )





























l       (10) 
 
and the first-order conditions for an optimum are 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )


















































a H  (< 0) and 
i
a D  (> 0) are the first derivatives of  ( )
i i a H 0 0  and  ( )
i i
H a0 D . 
 
A convenient simplification of the model is to assume that  0 = D
i


















              (12) 
 
This assumption – that current aid reduces the future level of poverty, but not its 
future rate of decline – is convenient both because it eases the exposition of the model 
and because equation (12) is simple enough to be applied in practice (as is explained 
in section 7).  It is of course not always accurate: current aid could affect the future 
rate of decline of poverty, for example by removing a bottleneck to growth through 
                                                
4 The International Finance Facility for Immunisation is a partial exception: it allows future aid to be 
brought forward by borrowing, though only for this particular purpose.  Aid is allocated in all periods 
up to the time horizon in Collier and Dollar (2001) and Cogneau and Naudet (2007). 
5 I am indebted to Tony Venables for suggesting this simplification. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 8 
construction of a port.  But it is unlikely that the  ( )
i i
H a0 D  function could in practice be 
quantified or included in a model, because its form varies so widely among countries 
(though ad hoc adjustments could be made to the allocations for countries where the 
effects of current aid on future poverty decline were believed to be large). 
 
Depending on the form of 
i
a H , it may be possible to rearrange (12) into an explicit 
expression for each country’s optimal aid.  The relationship between aid and poverty 
proposed by C-D yields such an expression, but before turning to this specific form, it 
is worth considering further the general form of the model.  With the assumption that 
0 = D
i
a , the model just modifies a current-period optimal allocation by including an 
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              (13) 
 






aD H                 (14) 
 
and if the time horizon of policy-makers did not extend beyond the current period (as 
in C-D) would reduce to  l =
i




rT D  affects the allocation of aid because the size of the adjustment 
varies, being larger for countries where poverty is falling slower (or rising) than for 
countries where poverty is falling faster.  How much difference this makes depends 
also on the discount rate and time horizon, as is illustrated in table 1, which shows, for 




rT D D  for a country i where poverty is 
declining at 1% per year and a country j where it is declining at 7% per year. 
 
The benefit of the adjustment to the slow-poverty-decline country i obviously rises as 
the discount rate falls and the time horizon becomes longer, both of which signify 
increased donor concern about future poverty relative to current poverty.  With a high 
discount rate or short time horizon, its adjustment is close to that of the rapid-poverty-
decline country j.  With a low r or long T, however, the slow-poverty-decline country 
benefits more, and with a zero discount rate and an infinite horizon, its adjustment is 
seven times that of the rapid-poverty-decline country. 
 
Cogneau and Naudet (2007) also propose a model in which the optimal allocation of 
aid depends on future rates of poverty decline.  Their objective is not to minimise total 
world poverty, but rather, on Rawlsian principles of fairness, to reduce inequality of 
poverty rates among countries.  More precisely, their model uses aid to reduce high 
values of 
i
T h  (poverty rates at the end of the planning period) due to forces beyond the 
control of the countries concerned.  As in the present model, more aid thus tends to be 
allocated to countries where 
i
H D  is low (and to countries where 
i h0 is high).  Unlike 
the present model, however, countries with high total poverty (
i H0) as a result of large 
populations rather than high poverty rates are not entitled to more aid. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 9 
 
5. Collier and Dollar as a special case 
 
The specific form of  ( )
i i a H 0 0  used by Collier and Dollar is  ( ) ( )
i i i i H A G 0 0 1 a + , where 
i H0 is a measure of income poverty, ￿
i is the poverty elasticity and  ( )
i i A G 0  is the 
relationship between growth  of per  capita  income  and the ratio  of aid to  GDP in 
equation (3) above.  The specific form for its derivative is thus 
 
( )
i i i i i
A H P b A b b H 0 5 0 4 3 2 a + + =           (15) 
 
and the optimal allocation of aid to each country is 
 















- + - =
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assuming as in the previous section that the future rate of decline in poverty, 
i
H D , is 
unaffected by this period’s aid. 
 
Apart from the appearance of time (zero) subscripts on some of the variables, this is 
the same as the equation (4) derived above from the C-D model, with the exception of 
the last term in the chain bracket.  This term is now multiplied by a round-bracketed 
expression, which is simply the reciprocal of the poverty decline adjustment, 
i
rT D .  As 
in equation (4), aid to a country rises with its current poverty rate, 
i h0 (which makes 
the negatively-signed second term in the chain bracket smaller).  In equation (16), 
however,  aid  is  increased  also  by  a  slower  future  rate  of  decline  in  poverty, 
i
H D  
(which also makes this second term smaller). 
 
The relative impact of present and future poverty on aid allocations depends on the 
discount rate, r, which reflects the degree of concern of policy makers about more 
distant as compared to nearer-term poverty.  For any given degree of variation across 
countries in 
i
H D , a larger r, since it is the same for all countries, reduces variation in 
( )
i
H r D + , so that variation among countries in their future poverty reduction rates has 
less effect on the allocation of aid among them, relative to variation in their current 
poverty rates, 
i h0.  A shorter time horizon, T, likewise tilts the balance of influence on 
allocations more towards present, relative to future, poverty.
6  
 
The C-D allocation model can thus be seen as a special case of the present more 
general model in which aid allocations are based only on current levels of poverty, 
without regard to future rates of change in poverty.  Equation (16) would generate 
much the same allocation of aid as  equation (4)  if r  were set high  and/or T  low, 
implying  concern  entirely  about  the  present,  since  this  would  make  the  poverty 
                                                 
6 Reducing T decreases D for all countries, but by proportionally more for those with slower rates of 
decline in poverty, which lessens the influence on allocations of differences in rates of decline, as can 
be seen from the numbers in table 1. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 10 
decline adjustment (the only substantive difference between the two equations) almost 
identical in value for all countries. 
 
Comparing the present model with MDG-based aid allocations is less easy, because 
the MDG approach is based on numerical targets for multiple poverty indicators to be 
attained by specific dates, rather than optimisation.  But if the single-valued poverty 
rate, h
i, is interpreted as a suitable average of these indicators, the spirit of the MDG-
based approach is captured reasonably well as a special case of equation (16) in which 
r is zero and T is high.  For any given degree of cross-country variation in 
i
H D , these 
parameter values would maximise variation in 
i
rT D  and thus maximise the influence 
on allocations of differences in poverty reduction prospects, broadly as was advocated 
in Millennium Project (2005). 
 
The present more general model is attractive because it combines the strong points of 
the C-D and MDG-based special cases while avoiding their shortcomings.  It retains 
the crucial C-D principle of allocating aid efficiently – an extra dollar of aid achieves 
the same reduction of poverty in every recipient country – while avoiding the myopia 
of the formal C-D model.  It also retains the attention rightly paid by the MDG-based 
approach to cross-country differences in poverty reduction prospects, while avoiding 
the inefficiency of its proposed allocations (in which an extra dollar of aid would 
reduce poverty by different amounts in different recipient countries). 
 
The C-D model is a special case in a second important sense.  Not only is its objective 
myopic, but it is also based on one specific form of the function  ( )
i i a H 0 0  that links aid 
to poverty reduction.  To operationalise any allocation model, it is clearly necessary to 
choose a specific form, but the choice matters greatly for the results.  The allocations 
generated by a model depend on what it assumes about the impact of aid on poverty, 
as  well  as  on  how  its  poverty  objective  is  specified.    Moreover,  there  is  much 
disagreement about the effects of aid on poverty reduction: how big, how rapid, and 
conditional on what characteristics of recipient countries, aid instruments and donor 
behaviour?
7  Disagreement about facts could cause disagreement about allocations, 
even among people with identical views on objectives. 
 
Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) allow for some disagreement about  ( )
i i a H 0 0  by trying 
alternative values for their estimated parameters b3, b4 and b5.
8  But the effectiveness 
of aid in increasing a country’s growth clearly depends on more than the quality of its 
policies.
9  So the b5A
iP
i term in equation (3) should be modified to make P
i into a 
vector of relevant country characteristics (including some of the exogenous influences 
on growth, X
i).  Even more fundamental is the C-D assumption that aid can reduce 
poverty only through growth – raising a whole country’s income – and that it cannot 
be targeted on poor people within countries.  Conclusions about optimal aid allocation 
based on the C-D specification of  ( )
i i a H 0 0  must thus be interpreted with caution. 
 
                                                 
7 The most extreme disagreement is between Sachs (2005) and Easterly (2006).  Milder but still strong 
disagreement is evident in, for example, Clemens et al. (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005). 
8 Beynon (2003) and Anderson and Waddington (2007) survey the debate about these parameters. 
9 E.g. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Dalgaard et al. (2004). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 11 
6. Illustration with regional data 
 
Although models are used to inform decisions about allocating aid among countries, 
the implications of sections 4 and 5 can be illustrated with data for the much smaller 
number of developing regions.  Table 2 adopts the World Bank regional classification, 
but separates out India and China to yield eight geographical units (all referred to as 
‘regions’ below).  For each region, the table shows the values of the variables in 
equation (16) which determine its aid allocation (
i i
H
i i i i P y N h a , , , , , 0 0 D ), with 2004 as 
the base year.  The poverty data – the initial headcount ratio, the projected rate of 
decline in the number of poor people (from 2004 to 2030), and the income elasticity 
(2004-15) – are from the World Bank.
10  The proxies for P
i are population-weighted 
regional average CPIA scores.
11 
 
Table 3 presents one illustrative optimal allocation of aid.  Its first column shows the 
initial number of poor people in each region, based on the same World Bank data as 
in table 2.
12  The second column shows the value of the poverty decline adjustment 
(equation 13), with a zero discount rate and a time horizon of 25 years (corresponding 
to the 1990-2015 time horizon of the MDGs, and to the 2004-30 poverty projections 
in table 2).  Policy makers are thus assumed to attach equal weight to poverty in each 
year up to their time horizon and not to care at all about poverty beyond this horizon.  
The third column, obtained by multiplying the first and second columns, shows the 
‘present value’ of future poverty (equation 8) prior to this period’s aid. 
 
The allocation of aid among regions which minimises the world total of the present 
value  of  future  poverty  (the  last  row  of  column  3)  is  shown  in  column  4.    The 
percentages of aid are also absolute amounts, since the world aid total is set at $100 
billion, to correspond roughly with the commitments made by donors in 2005.  The 
allocation is based on the C-D form of  ( )
i i a H 0 0 , and uses the values of b3, b4 and b5 in 
C-D (2002) Variant I (-0.54, -0.02, and 0.31 respectively). 
 
The middle-income regions in the bottom half of the table (East Asia, Latin America, 
Europe and Central Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa) are allocated no aid – 
not even China, which starts with more than 100 million poor people.  This outcome 
is similar to that of C-D (2001, 2002), though it is exaggerated by the use of regional 
aggregate data, which conceal the low-income countries in middle-income regions.  It 
arises because, with the C-D form of  ( )
i i a H 0 0 , aid can reduce poverty only by raising 
national income, which makes it more efficient to give aid to regions with many poor 




i) – an indicator on which, as is 
shown in column 5 of table 3, the middle-income regions are far below Africa and 
South Asia, both because of their lower h
i and because of their higher y
i. 
                                                 
10 These data were kindly supplied by Dominique van der Mensbrugghe.  The poverty levels and trends 
are similar to those in Table 2.3 of World Bank (2007a), revised and updated for World Bank (2007b), 
including a change of base year from 2003 to 2004.  The elasticities, which are not published, are 
explained in note 37 of chapter 2 of World Bank (2007a). 
11 CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) scores, calculated by the World Bank, are also 
used by C-D (2001, 2002).  These regional averages are based on unofficial estimates of the scores for 
individual countries (which are not published by the Bank for most countries and years). 
12 These numbers are not exactly consistent with those that could be obtained by multiplying together 
the first two columns of table 2, and differ considerably for Other South Asia and Other East Asia. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 12 
 
The allocations among the low-income regions are at first sight surprising.  Africa 
gets only one-third of the aid, despite the forward-looking poverty reduction objective 
and a slower projected decline of poverty than in South Asia.  India, moreover, gets 
substantially  less  aid  than  Other  South  Asia,  despite  having  five  times  as  much 
poverty initially and a slower projected decline of poverty.  The explanations for both 
outcomes are differences among these regions in the effectiveness of aid, which offset 
the differences in their needs for aid.  The combination of a lower CPIA score and a 
lower poverty elasticity causes aid to reduce poverty by substantially less in Africa 
than in South Asia.  In India, likewise, a far lower poverty elasticity than in Other 
South Asia  outweighs a somewhat higher CPIA score, making  it efficient to  give 
more aid to Other South Asia. 
 
This illustrative optimal allocation of aid differs greatly from its actual allocation, 
shown for 2004 in the last column of table 3.  The middle-income regions got half of 
all aid, in contrast to their zero optimal shares, confirming that much aid is given for 
reasons other than poverty reduction (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; C-D, 2002).  The 
allocation of the other half among the low-income regions is also different: India’s 
actual 3% share of the low-income subtotal is far lower than its optimal 26% share, 
reflecting size bias; and Africa actually gets four times as much aid as Other South 
Asia, rather than somewhat less aid, as in the optimal allocation (though its share of 
total world aid is by coincidence fairly similar in columns 4 and 6 of table 3). 
 
Table 4, which addresses the central point of this paper, shows how the illustrative 
allocations among low-income regions vary with the choice of discount rate and time 
horizon.  The middle row is the same as in table 3, showing the optimal shares for a 
zero discount rate and a  time  horizon  of 25 years.   The two rows above it show 
allocations with less future-oriented objectives: the C-D special case of a one-year 
time horizon is in the first row, and a 25-year horizon combined with a 10% discount 
rate in the second row.  The last two rows of table 4 are more future-oriented: as in 
table 3, a zero discount rate is assumed in both cases, but the time horizon is extended 
from 25 years to 50 years in the fourth row, and to 100 years in the final row (the 
‘MDG’ special case, with maximum weight on poverty reduction prospects).
13 
 
The first column shows the share of Africa in the low-income subtotal (which in all 
cases is also the world total, since in no case does any middle-income region get any 
aid).  In the first row, in which the aim is to minimise near-term world poverty, Africa 
gets no aid at all, despite its 40% share of all the poor people in low-income regions.  
Given the CPIA scores and poverty elasticities in table 2, and the assumed values of 
the parameters of the C-D aid-growth function, the effectiveness of aid to Africa is 
too low to justify any allocation.  (This outcome is different from C-D (2001, 2002), 
in which, even with no future orientation, African countries are allocated substantial 
amounts of aid, mainly because the C-D poverty elasticities are more favourable to 
Africa than those in table 2.) 
 
However, moving down the first column of table 4, it can be seen that, despite the low 
effectiveness  of  aid  to  Africa  in  these  calculations,  its  allocation  of  aid  increases 
rapidly as the poverty objective becomes more future-oriented.  Assuming r = 0, a 25-
                                                 
13 Over all these time horizons, poverty is assumed to decline at the 2004-30 rates shown in table 2. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 13 
year horizon raises its share of the low-income subtotal from zero to one-third, a 50-
year horizon to two-thirds, and with a 100-year horizon Africa gets all the aid.  The 
share of India in the low-income subtotal (column 2) correspondingly declines, but 
there is not much change in the relative shares of India and Other South Asia (column 
3), and the share of Africa relative to Other South Asia rises steeply (column 4). 
 
The numbers in table 4 illustrate the effects of variation in donor objectives.  Those in 
table 5, in which r and T are held constant, show how allocations vary with the values 
of the parameters of the growth function (equation 3) and of the poverty elasticities.  
The base case, in the first row, is again that of table 3.  The next two rows alter b3 and 
b5,  increasing  and  decreasing  respectively  the  sensitivity  of  allocations  to  policy 
scores (these are Variants III and IV of C-D, 2002).  The following two rows alter b4, 
increasing and decreasing respectively the rate at which returns to aid diminish.
14  The 
final row,  which  reverts  to the base case growth parameters, replaces  the  poverty 
elasticities in table 2, which vary widely among regions, with a uniform elasticity of -
2 in all regions, as assumed in C-D (2002).
15 
 
The last four columns of table 5 show the effects of these parameter variations on the 
four aspects of the allocation of aid among low-income regions explored in table 4 
(none of these variations gives any aid to to middle-income regions).  For example, 
less  sensitivity  to  policy  scores  substantially  increases  Africa’s  share  of  aid  and 
reduces India’s share to almost zero, so that Other South Asia also gains slightly.  By 
contrast, faster diminution of returns to aid doubles India’s share, at the expense of 
both Africa and (somewhat more) other South Asia.  Removing the variation among 
regions in poverty elasticities has almost no effect on India, but the share of Other 
South Asia, which had by far the most favourable elasticity, drops to zero, and the 
share of Africa rises from one-third to three-quarters. 
 
The calculations  that Cogneau and Naudet (2007,  table 5) make to illustrate their 
forward-looking allocation model also show the sensitivity of the results to poverty 
elasticities.  When they assume, as in the last row of the present table 5, the C-D form 
of  ( )
i i a H 0 0  and uniform elasticities of -2, Africa gets almost all of the aid to low-
income regions (though, unlike the present calculations, one-third of world aid goes to 
countries  in  middle-income  regions).    When  Cogneau  and  Naudet  let  poverty 
elasticities vary among countries, however, Africa gets only about half of the aid to 
low-income regions (in the present calculations, using the base case parameters and 
with elasticities varying among regions, Africa’s share would be about half if r were 
zero and T 35 years). 
 
In summary, the numerical illustrations in table 4 confirm that the optimal allocation 
of aid among regions depends heavily on the degree of future orientation of the world 
poverty reduction objective.  With a near-term view, it makes sense to allocate Africa 
                                                 
14 The coefficient is raised in the ‘faster’ case to the value in Variant II of C-D (2002) and is lowered in 
the ‘slower’ case by one standard deviation (from regression 1 of table 1 in C-D, 2002). 
15 C-D (2002) use this uniform elasticity for their calculations based on the headcount poverty measure, 
but use varying elasticities for other poverty measures.  See also Beynon (2003: 13-14).  In a forward-
looking model, variation in poverty elasticities among countries can have offsetting effects: for a given 
growth rate of income, a higher elasticity accelerates future poverty reduction and so tends to reduce a 
country’s aid allocation (by lowering the present value of its future poverty); but a higher elasticity also 
increases the effectiveness of aid and hence tends to increase the country’s allocation. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 14 
no aid, because the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty in Africa is low.  With an 
extremely long-term view, by contrast, it makes sense to allocate Africa all the aid.  
However, the numbers in table 5 are a reminder that disagreements about the optimal 
allocation of aid are as likely to arise from disagreements about its effects on poverty 
as from disagreements about the correct specification of the objective of aid. 
 
7. Application in practice 
 
The central idea of this paper, summarised initially in figure 1, is that any poverty-
efficient allocation of aid must recognise that  donors care about both present and 
future poverty.   Section 4  developed this idea algebraically, and sections 5  and 6 
showed that it has a large effect on allocations.  The issue for this section is whether 
and how this idea could be implemented by donor agencies. 
 
It would be unrealistic to try to specify a single model which all donors should adopt.  
Each agency has its allocation practices, which will not be swept away and replaced 
by something new.  Moreover, practices necessarily vary among agencies, depending 
on their circumstances, both political (e.g. the weight attached to poverty reduction as 
an objective) and administrative (e.g. a multilateral or a bilateral, and, if a bilateral, 
whether one or several agencies are involved).  The most that a paper such as this can 
offer is suggestions that might be used to improve current practices. 
 
Donors use simple allocation formulae rather than explicit optimising models (though, 
as is shown in the appendix, there are implicit and unrecognised models behind these 
formulae).  The typical formula allocates aid among countries in proportion to scores, 
S
i, based on the combination of some measure of each country’s current poverty with 
some measure of the quality of its policies 
 
g i i i i P N h S 0 0 =           (17) 
 
where 
i i i H N h 0 0 0 =  is poverty (rate multiplied by population size), P
i is policy, and ￿ is 
the importance attached to policy.
16  Some donor formulae include other variables that 
affect how much aid reduces poverty, in which case P
i￿ can be interpreted simply as 
some composite indicator of aid effectiveness.
17 
 
The formula in (17), like the C-D model, focuses only on current levels of poverty, 
and thus tends to allocate a smaller share of aid to Africa than poverty-oriented donors 
want to provide, so that it is not used (or modified by some other rule) in this aspect 
of their decisions.  Similarly, the prescriptions of the formula conflict with those of 
the MDG-based approach.  The solution to these problems suggested by the analysis 
in section 4 is to adjust the measure of poverty to allow for its future trajectory as well 
as its current level.
18  The formula thus becomes 
                                                 
16 The formulae used by donors are surveyed by Keith (2002) and Jones et al. (2004).  From 2003 to 
2004, the DFID formula was systematically biased against larger countries by attaching an exponent of 
0.6 to population size, following Collier and Dollar (2001). 
17 Because each donor allocates only part of the world’s aid, usually among only a subset of countries, 
some formulae also adjust for the amounts of aid that countries are likely to get from other donors 
(Beynon and Landymore, 2002; Jones et al., 2004). 
18 DFID’s allocation formula has already moved in this direction.  As a result of the recommendations 
in Dyer et al. (2003), it was modified to give (slightly) more aid to countries that were making slower QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 15 
 
g i i i
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D + - 1
        (19) 
 
is the poverty decline adjustment for the country concerned (copied from equation 13 
earlier).  As before, 
i
H D  is the projected annual rate of decline in poverty over the next 
T years, and r is the rate at which, up to this time horizon, policy-makers discount 
future poverty relative to current poverty. 
 
The modified formula (18) and adjustment (19) can be applied to whatever measure 
of poverty a donor regards as best, subject to the availability of data.  The poverty 
rate, 
i h0, can be any index (for example, the headcount or the squared poverty gap) 
and based on any number of dimensions of poverty, provided that these are combined 
in some appropriate way into a single number (which has yet to be done for the MDG 




H n - D = D , then has to be projected for 
the chosen measure of the poverty rate, adjusted by population growth. 
 
One  obvious  practical  issue  in  using  the  modified  formula  is  how  to  project  the 
decline in poverty for each country.  It would be unreasonable to expect each donor to 
make its own projections – and undesirable in relation to the objective of improving 
aid coordination.  A better approach would be for all donors to use projections made 
by one international agency such as the World Bank.  Relevant projections are already 
published, both for income headcount poverty (e.g. World Bank, 2007a, table 2.3) and 
for progress towards non-income MDG targets (e.g. World Bank, 2007b). 
 
Expected future aid should be taken into account in projecting each country’s rate of 
poverty decline, 
i
H D .  As was explained in section 4, however, the adjustment (19) is 
based on the simplifying assumption that this period’s aid lowers the future level of 
poverty, but does not affect its rate of decline.  Thus if a donor had reason to believe 
that the amount of aid it allocated to a country in the current period would raise 
i
H D  
substantially, for example by removing a bottleneck, then it should make an ad hoc 
(upward) adjustment to the formula allocation for that country.
19 
 
Another practical issue in using the modified formula is the choice of values for r and 
T, which affects the relative sizes of the adjustment for different countries (given their 
projected rates of poverty decline).  Politicians and other senior policy-makers are 
unlikely  to  be  able  or  willing  to  specify  particular  values  at  the  outset,  but  their 
preferences could be inferred by asking them to choose among alternative allocations 
based on different values of r and T.  They might allow the values that emerged to be 
                                                                                                                                         
progress towards MDG targets.  Since 2006, the poverty measure has been the projected level of per 
capita income in 2010 rather than the latest available actual level. 
19  Donors should make other ad hoc adjustments to allow for information about specific countries that 
is not adequately captured by the formula or reflected in the available data. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 16 
used routinely in the allocation formula.  Conceivably, all donor agencies might be 
able to agree, in the framework of the DAC, to use the same values of r and T. 
 
An attractively simple option would be to set r at zero and T at 25 years.  The 25 years 
has some basis in reality, since it matches the 1990-2015 timespan of the MDGs.  The 
combination of a zero discount rate for the quarter-century ahead and (in effect) an 
infinite discount rate thereafter would also capture much of the greater concern of 
policy-makers about current than about future poverty.  Even over the next 25 years, 
they probably care more about nearer-term than about more distant poverty, but there 
has been little in the debate about the MDGs to suggest that this is a major concern. 
 
The use of the modified formula (18) can be illustrated by applying it to the data in 
the previous section.  Table 6 reports the allocations prescribed by the formula for the 
same range of values of T as in table 4 (with a zero discount rate), assuming that ￿ = 2.  
Its first four columns are also the same as in earlier tables: they show how the formula 
allocates aid among low-income regions.  The last column shows how much in total it 
allocates to middle-income regions, although in practice poverty-oriented donors limit 
aid to these regions, on the grounds that they can afford to pay for their own poverty 
reduction or have better access to international capital markets.
20 
 
In the first row of panel A, a low T yields a result similar to the unmodified formula 
(17), with only 30% of aid to low-income regions assigned to Africa and well over 
half to India.  Allowing for differences in poverty reduction prospects by extending T 
to 25 years raises Africa’s share by 10 percentage points and lowers India’s.  Raising 
T to 50 years makes Africa’s share similar to that of India.  Extending T to 100 years 
raises Africa’s share to 62% and lowers that of India to 36%. 
 
The general pattern of these results is the same as in table 4, but the variation is 
smaller, especially for Africa.  Moreover, middle-income regions got no aid in table 4, 
but are allocated substantial amounts in table 6.  Since the poverty reduction objective 
is identical in the corresponding rows of tables 4 and 6, the difference in allocations 
between the two tables reflects a difference of views about how aid reduces poverty 
or, to be more precise, about  ( )
i i a H 0 0 : table 4 is based on the C-D specification, while 
table 6 uses the specification implicit in the donor formula.  The two specifications 
overlap, but are different, as is shown in the appendix.  Not least, C-D assume that aid 
can reduce poverty only by making entire countries richer, while the donor formula 
assumes that aid can be targeted on poor people within countries. 
 
Since in practice donors cap their allocations to India, panel B of table 6 shows what 
the other shares would become if India were limited to 3% of the world aid total.  
Africa’s share of the low-income subtotal is substantially increased: for example, with 
r = 0 and T = 25, it rises from 39% to 84%.  The India cap also raises the share of 
Other South Asia in total aid to South Asia (in this case up from 9% to 73%), but it 
does not alter the relative shares of Africa and Other South Asia. 
 
Although the modified formula (18) is usable with any measure of poverty, the pattern 
of allocations implied by the formula will depend on which measure is chosen, since 
                                                 
20 Thus, for example, DFID reserves 90% of its bilateral aid for low-income countries, and the World 
Bank allocates IDA funds only among a restricted set of low-income countries. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 17 
different measures will alter the relative poverty levels of different countries (or their 
relative projected rates of decline in poverty).  To illustrate this point, panel C of table 
6 shows what the shares would be if poverty were measured, as it is at present in most 
donor formulae,  by the average  per capita income of  a country rather than  by its 
income poverty headcount, as in panel A.
21  In all other respects, the calculations for 
panels A and C are identical (and in both the allocations to India are uncapped). 
 
Comparing panels A and C shows that this change of poverty measure, which makes 
India seem relatively less poor than in terms of its poverty headcount, and so less 
deserving of aid, lowers its share of the low-income subtotal, and raises the shares of 
the other two low-income regions.  The increase in Africa’s share of the low-income 
subtotal is fairly small.  It is larger for Other South Asia, which looks much poorer, 




The puzzle that prompted this paper is that poverty-oriented donors allocate more aid 
to Africa than the C-D poverty-minimising allocation model suggests and, relatedly, 
that this model clashes with the poverty-focused MDGs.  The solution to this puzzle, 
the paper argues, is that the poverty reduction objective of the C-D model is myopic, 
whereas donors (and the MDGs) are forward-looking – they care about future poverty 
as well as current poverty. 
 
The paper shows how an improved model could include concern about future poverty 
in its objective while retaining the best feature of the C-D model, which is to allocate 
aid efficiently (meaning so as to get closest to the objective).  The paper also suggests 
a specific modification to the aid allocation formulae used by donors, which is to add 
a future poverty decline adjustment.  This modification could make donor decisions 
more consistent (e.g. avoiding the need for separate Africa quotas) and reduce conflict 
and confusion between the formulae and the MDG targets. 
 
Improvements of these sorts could not solve all the problems of aid allocation among 
countries, because inefficient or inconsistent treatment of the balance between current 
and future poverty is only one reason for disagreement about the relative amounts of 
aid that different countries should receive.  Even people who agree that the objective 
of aid is to minimise world poverty may disagree about allocations also because they 
have differing views about how poverty should be measured.  In addition and more 
fundamentally, they may disagree about allocations because of factual disagreements 
about how aid contributes to the reduction of poverty.  
 
This paper thus makes only a partial contribution to improving the allocation of aid 
among countries, which itself is only part of the overall problem of improving aid.  It 
takes the global total of aid as given, and does not ask how to deliver aid to countries 
better.  Nor, of course, would improving aid be sufficient to eliminate world poverty.  
What the paper offers is much more limited, but still worth having: a better grasp of 
the time dimension of the objective of poverty-oriented aid. 
 
                                                 
21 For these calculations, using the data on y




i i y h .  The same values of 
i
H D , also from 
table 2, are used as for the calculations in panels A and B. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 18 
Appendix: Comparison of typical donor formula with Collier-Dollar model 
 
The allocation formulae used by donors are often labelled ‘Collier-Dollar’, and are 
based on similar principles – the aim of using aid to reduce poverty and the belief that 
the effectiveness of aid depends on the quality of a country’s policies.  However, their 
algebraic forms are clearly different (compare equations 4 and 17) and they generate 
different numbers (for given measures of poverty and policy: compare table 4 and 
panel A of table 6).  The differences arise from different views about exactly how aid 
contributes to poverty reduction – different assumptions about the form of  ( )
i i a H 0 0 . 
 
The typical donor formula, though not derived from an optimising model (as in C-D), 
does imply such a model, which can be made explicit.  The formula in equation (17) 
allocates aid to each country in proportion to its poverty-policy score 
 
g j











0           (A2) 
 
which divides up total available aid,  0 A .  The factor of proportionality, ￿, can be 
interpreted as the inverse, 1/￿, of a Lagrangian multiplier (provided that all countries 
have positive scores, and hence all are allocated some aid by the formula).  Equation 









0 0             (A3) 
 
and integrated to infer the relevant parts of the implied Lagrangian 
 






- + - =
i i
i i i i i i a A a P N h C L 0 0 0 0 0 ln l
g     (A4) 
 
where C is the constant of integration (a sum of terms which affect the amount of 
poverty in a country but are unrelated to its level of aid).  The specific form of the 
function  ( )
i i a H 0 0  implicitly assumed by donors is thus  
 
( )
i i i i i i i a P N h C a H 0 0 0 0 0 ln
g - =         (A5) 
 
in which the effect of aid on poverty depends on the initial level of poverty, multiplied 
by the natural log of the amount of aid and by the country’s policy score to the power 
￿.  The specific form assumed by C-D, in comparable notation, is 
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0 0 a   (A6) 
 
which includes two extra variables: the poverty elasticity, ￿
i, whose negative sign 
makes the whole non-constant term negative, as in (A5), and national income, Y
i. 
 
Their inclusion reflects a basic divergence of views about how aid reduces poverty.  
The donor formula assumes that aid can be targeted within each country on people 
who are poor, so that there is a direct link (through unspecified channels) from the 
amount of aid to the amount of poverty reduction.  By contrast, as emphasised by 
Beynon (2003), C-D assume that aid cannot be targeted within countries.  In their 
model, the only channel through which aid can reduce poverty in a country is by 
accelerating its growth – thus raising its per capita income, which lowers poverty to 
an extent dependent on its poverty elasticity.  Thus in (A6), unlike (A5), total initial 
poverty, 
i iN h 0 0 , is divided by national income, Y
i (= 
i iN y 0), which reflects the fact that 
with the C-D form of  ( )
i i a H 0 0  a given amount of aid reduces poverty more if it is 
allocated to a country with more poverty per dollar of national income. 
 
This difference in assumptions explains why middle-income regions do worse in table 
4 than in table 6.  According to the donor equation (A5), to maximise the impact on 
world poverty reduction, aid should be allocated among countries in proportion to the 
absolute amounts of poverty in them.  But the C-D equation (A6) allocates little or no 
aid to countries where poverty is large in absolute terms but small relative to national 
income (which depends on population size and per capita income).  If the poor are a 
small share of the population (a low h
i), most aid (if it simply raised average incomes) 
would be ‘wasted’ on the non-poor majority.  And because growth in the C-D model 
depends on the ratio of aid to national income, a higher per capita income (y
i) means 
that a given absolute amount of aid would add less to the growth of income. 
 
There are other differences between (A5) and (A6) in their assumptions about the 
effects of aid on poverty, which also affect optimal allocations.  One concerns how 
fast returns to aid diminish, which can be compared by calculating second derivatives, 
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a =           (A8) 
 
which like (A7) is positive (because both ￿
i and b4 have negative signs), meaning that 
the poverty-reducing effect of aid declines as the level of aid increases.  The relative 
speeds at which returns diminish in the two equations depends on the values of their 
other variables and parameters, but the log form of (A5) implies rapid diminution (e.g. 
each doubling of aid cuts poverty by only the same absolute amount). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS137  Page 20 
 
Another important influence on optimal allocation is how much the effectiveness of 
aid in reducing poverty in a country is thought to depend on the quality of its policies.  
To compare this aspect of equations (A5) and (A6), they can be differentiated first 
with respect to 
i a0 and then with respect to P
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          (A10) 
 
which  like (A9) is negative (because  of the sign  of ￿
i), meaning that aid  reduces 
poverty by more as the policy score increases.  The relative impact of policy in these 
two equations again depends on the values of their other variables and parameters. 
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Table 1.  Effects of variation in r and T on poverty decline adjustment
(D for country with ￿ H = 1% p.a., divided by D for country with ￿ H = 7% p.a.)
Values of 
r (% p.a.) 1 5 10 25 100 ￿
0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.9 4.4 7.0
5 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.0
10 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5
25 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
100 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1



















Table 2.  Variables influencing the allocation of aid
$1-a-day Average Projected Estimated
poverty per capita Average decline in income
headcount Population income CPIA poverty elasticity
2004 2004 2004 score 2004-30 of poverty
(%) (millions) (PPP$000) 2001 (% p.a.) 2004-15
Sub-Saharan Africa 41.1 719 1.9 3.3 -0.3 -0.7
South Asia 32.0 1448 2.8 4.0 3.4 -1.4
    India 35.8 1080 3.1 4.2 2.9 -1.1
    Other South Asia 28.8 368 2.0 3.6 7.3 -3.8
East Asia 9.1 1870 5.1 3.9 9.6 -2.3
    China 9.9 1297 5.5 4.1 9.7 -1.9
    Other East Asia 8.8 574 4.0 3.6 9.2 -3.7
Latin America 8.6 541 7.7 4.0 0.8 -1.7
Europe and Central Asia 0.9 472 8.4 3.2 2.7 -1.7
Middle East and North Africa 1.5 294 5.8 4.0 1.8 -2.5
Developing regions 18.4 5344 4.6 3.8 2.1 -1.3
Notes: East Asia includes Pacific; Latin America includes Caribbean.
Sources: population and per capita income from World Development Indicators; for others, see text.
Table 3.  Illustrative aid allocation with poverty-decline-adjusted C-D model (r = 0, T = 25)
$1-a-day Optimal Poverty Actual
poverty Poverty 'Present shares over GNI shares of
headcount decline value' of of total (poor per total aid
2004 adjust- future aid $million) in 2004
(millions) ment poverty (%) 2004 (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa 298 26 7785 32.5 222 37.1
South Asia 462 17 7825 67.5 113 10.4
    India 386 18 6873 26.0 115 1.5
    Other South Asia 76 12 873 41.6 141 8.8
East Asia 169 9 1603 0.0 18 10.7
    China 128 9 1205 0.0 18 1.9
    Other East Asia 41 10 398 0.0 22 8.9
Latin America 47 23 1060 0.0 11 10.1
Europe and Central Asia 4 18 81 0.0 1 16.9
Middle East and North Africa 4 20 89 0.0 3 14.8
Developing regions 985 20 18443 100.0 40 100.0
Sources: Actual aid from World Development Indicators (2004 total $70 billion); for others, see text.
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Table 4.  Effects of alternative values of r and T on illustrative aid allocation
Africa/ India/ OSA/ Africa/
low-income low-income South Asia   Africa+OSA
No weight on future (r = 0, T = 1) 0.0 34.7 65.3 0.0
Some weight on future (r = 10%, T = 25) 14.0 33.1 61.5 20.9
More weight on future (r = 0, T = 25) 32.5 26.0 61.6 43.8
Greater weight on future (r = 0, T = 50) 67.2 12.2 63.0 76.5
Most weight on future (r = 0, T = 100) 100.0 0.0 n.a. 100.0
Notes: 'Low-income' is sub-Saharan Africa plus South Asia; 'OSA' is Other South Asia
Source: simulations explained in text, identical in all other respects to those in table 3.
Table 5.  Sensitivity of allocation to parameters of C-D aid-poverty reduction function
b3 b4 b5 Africa/ India/ OSA/ Africa/
low-income low-income South Asia   Africa+OSA
Base case -0.54 -0.02 0.31 32.5 26.0 61.6 43.8
Sensitivity to quality of policy
    Greater -0.93 -0.02 0.42 15.1 45.9 45.9 27.8
    Lesser -0.15 -0.02 0.21 52.4 1.1 97.7 53.0
Diminishing returns to aid
    Faster -0.54 -0.04 0.31 24.2 50.8 33.0 49.1
    Slower -0.54 -0.01 0.31 33.6 0.0 100.0 33.6
Poverty elasticities in all regions = -2
-0.54 -0.02 0.31 74.9 25.1 0.0 100.0
Source: Simulations explained in text.  'Base case' is that in table 3, and in all variants only the
indicated parameters are altered: r = 0 and T = 25 in all variants.
Table 6.  Illustrative aid allocations with poverty-decline-adjusted donor formula
Africa/ India/ OSA/ Africa/ Middle-
low-income low-income South Asia   Africa+OSA income
A. Headcount poverty measure
No weight on future (r = 0, T = 1) 29.8 61.3 12.7 77.0 23.7
More weight on future (r = 0, T = 25) 39.0 55.6 8.7 88.0 16.9
Greater weight on future (r = 0, T = 50) 47.9 48.5 7.0 92.9 14.3
Most weight on future (r = 0, T = 100) 62.2 35.6 5.9 96.6 11.8
B. Headcount poverty measure, India capped
No weight on future (r = 0, T = 1) 73.0 5.3 80.5 77.0 43.1
More weight on future (r = 0, T = 25) 84.2 4.3 72.7 88.0 30.5
Greater weight on future (r = 0, T = 50) 89.3 3.9 63.3 92.9 23.7
Most weight on future (r = 0, T = 100) 93.1 3.6 47.9 96.6 16.7
C. Per capita income poverty measure
No weight on future (r = 0, T = 1) 33.7 48.0 27.7 64.7 38.7
More weight on future (r = 0, T = 25) 44.7 44.1 20.2 80.0 30.2
Greater weight on future (r = 0, T = 50) 54.4 38.1 16.5 87.8 25.9
Most weight on future (r = 0, T = 100) 68.5 27.1 14.1 93.9 20.9
Source: Calculations with equations (18 - 19), using the same data as in tables 2 and 3.  In all cases,
￿ = 2.  Equations modified for panel C, as explained in text.
Aid shares (%)
Aid shares (%)
Parameter values Aid shares (%)
 
 